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How can we integrate the agential influence of state preferences and the structural
influence of social environments in models of change within international
organisations? Through an analysis of the central aspects of the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative, this article argues that in isolation neither of the
two dominant accounts of international organisations — the principal-agent (PA)
and constructivist approaches — is able to adequately capture the progression of
the initiative. Rather, I show that the evolution of the PRSP initiative is best
conceptualised as an Archerian morphogenic cycle, whose unfolding can be
understood by synthesising elements of the PA and constructivist approaches. The
morphogenic approach provides an analytic framework capable of tracking the
process of multilevel feedback from state socialisation through to policy
operationalisation, and for the input of creditors, the International Financial
Institutions (IFIs), and borrowing countries to be mapped.
Journal of International Relations and Development (2010) 13, 59–84.
doi:10.1057/jird.2009.28
Keywords: IMF; World Bank; PRSP; principal-agent; constructivist; morphogenic
Introduction
Who writes the rules for the international financial institutions, and how do
these rules change?1 These questions are central to the study of the operations
of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Now in its ninth
year of operation, the PRSP initiative has recently begun to receive the
attention of academic analysts (Craig and Porter 2002; Cheru 2006; Sumner
2006; Weber 2006), but as yet a systematic analysis of the changes in IFI
practices that have been engendered by the Initiative has not been presented.
This article addresses this lacuna, and also contributes to the growing literature
enhancing our understanding of change in the rules and practices of the IFIs by
building on — and synthesising — principal-agent (PA) and constructivist
analyses of International Organisations (IOs) (Jupille et al. 2003; Nielson et al.
2006; Weaver and Park 2007). The empirical content of the article is drawn
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from an analysis of IMF archival material, publicly available IMF and World
Bank documents, G7 ministerial declarations, and interviews with Bank and
Fund staff.2
In this opening section of the article, I provide an overview of the conceptual
lessons that can be drawn from the case study under analysis, and an
introduction to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative. In the
Models of Change in International Organisations section, I then provide a
fuller account of the PA and constructivist interpretations of IOs, examine
where these approaches assume the drivers of change in IOs to be, and outline
the advances that can be made by combining the insights of the approaches
around a morphogenic conceptualisation of change. In the third, fourth, and
fifth sections I outline the evolution of the central aspects of the PRSP
initiative, which are namely multilateral debt sustainability, poverty-reduction-
centred development, and the promotion of broad societal participation in the
formation of restructuring programmes. I conclude the article with a review of
the conceptual lessons that are revealed through the analysis of the PRSP
initiative.
The central lesson of the article is that the evolutionary progression of the
PRSP initiative is not adequately covered by either of the dominant approaches
to the study of IOs. Although the PA approach usefully foregrounds the
importance of powerful states in articulating the agenda for change, and offers
insight particularly into the circumstances in which states are able to compel
IOs to introduce change, the constructivist approach directs attention to both
the social environment that (partially) determines the content of states’
demands,3 and to the capacity of IOs to define the precise meaning of these
articulations. In addition, neither of the dominant approaches adequately
interrogates the input of borrowing countries into the continuing process of
‘fine-tuning’ and operationalising the demands for change. By conceptualising
the process of change in terms of morphogenic cycles, we are able to integrate
and build on the contributions of the PA and constructivist approaches. By
viewing the relationship between agents and structures as codeterminant, the
morphogenic approach advances an understanding of social change as a
dynamic feedback process: the structural environment conditions agents;
agential interactions re-form structures; altered structures re-condition agents,
ad infinitum. When applied to the realm of IOs, this conceptualisation of
change allows us to see clearly how the mechanisms upheld by both the PA and
constructivist approaches are in evidence during the case under investigation.
These points are elaborated further in the second section of the article.
The PRSP Initiative was formally announced by the Boards of the World
Bank and IMF at their Annual Meeting in December 1999, when it was
presented as both a key mechanism for distributing debt reduction under the
enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative, and as a broader
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alteration of the way in which the Bank and Fund worked with the poorest
developing countries. In order to receive a potential 90 per cent reduction of
International Development Association (IDA) debt within the World Bank
and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) debt within the Fund,
countries were required to produce a PRSP and demonstrate a commitment to
implementing the policy package contained therein. According to the IFIs’
guidelines on the PRSP initiative, the Paper itself was to be produced by
indebted country governments in consultation with civil society and other
stakeholders, and must present an analysis of the form and extent of poverty
within the country, a programme for poverty alleviation linking specific health
and educational policies into broader structural reforms aimed at improving
economic growth, and a timetable for the implementation of this programme.
Once a Paper has been approved by the IFIs, it is supposed to then form
the basis of all interactions between the IFIs and the indebted country (World
Bank and IMF 2000: 3).
When announced, the core elements of the PRSP Initiative were heralded as
representing a significant shift in the practices of the IFIs. Oxfam International
suggested that the PRSP framework ‘signalled a dramatic change in the way
the IMF and World Bank do business in poor countries’ (Oxfam International
2000: 3), while the IFIs themselves suggested that the Initiative went ‘well
beyond’ a simple revision of the way in which concessional finance was
provided (World Bank and IMF 2000: 1). As this article demonstrates,
although the incorporation of debt reduction into the operations of the IFIs
represents a significant shift in practices, the changes that have emerged as the
poverty reduction and participatory aspects of the initiative have evolved are
more limited.
Models of Change in International Organisations
The conventional wisdom within IPE holds that the actions of the World Bank
and IMF are largely driven by their major quota-holding member states. The
influence of the US and other G7 states in securing easy access to IFI resources
for their allies has been examined in this regard (Stone 2004: 578), and the
reports of the long-arm of the ‘US Treasury-Wall Street Complex’ in deter-
mining the general direction of the IFIs further fits this picture (Wade 2002).
However, recent research has added greater depth to our understanding of the
strategic relationships between states and IOs, with scholars beginning to con-
sider the means through which IOs can potentially exercise a significant degree
of autonomy from their member state principals. Throughout this section,
I outline the conceptual developments that the PA and constructivist approaches
have brought, and present the synthesis that is called for in order to adequately
capture the mechanisms that shaped the evolution of the PRSP initiative.
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Of the two main approaches to studying IOs that are outlined here, the PA
model is more closely aligned with the conventional wisdom in IPE. At its core,
the PA approach attempts to ‘examine IOs in their roles as agents variously
responsible to member states’, and to address the two linked questions of ‘why
do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to IOs?’ and ‘how do states
control IOs once authority has been delegated?’ (Hawkins et al. 2006: 4).
Drawing on the insights of economic analyses into relationships where one
party hires another to perform a function on its behalf, the approach analyses
the tension between the gains that can be made by states’ delegation of
authority to, and the imperfect mechanisms through which they attempt to
maintain control of, an IO (Bauer 2002: 382, Pollack 2003: 134–6).
When addressing the issue of ‘why delegate?’, PA theory begins with the
assumption that gains can be made through a division of labour and
specialisation. In the realm of inter-state relations, a number of additional
gains are identified that might induce states to delegate to an IO, including
aiding collective decision-making amongst member states, resolving disputes,
and locking-in policies. The larger the potential gains in these areas, the more
likely it is that states will delegate authority to an IO (Lake and McCubbins
2006: 342–4).
In relation to the latter of the two guiding questions of PA investigations, a
great deal of attention is paid to the mechanisms of control that are available to
states. Generally, providing an IO is producing policies that are broadly
consistent with principals’ preferences, states will leave the IO to act on its own:
however, when intervention is deemed to be necessary, a range of control
mechanisms are available to states to reign in an IO’s activities (Nielson and
Tierney 2003: 245). Following a rationalist approach, states are said to
structure the incentives of agents in such a way that it is in the interests of
agents to faithfully carry out principals’ wishes. Mechanisms of control include
the balance between rules and discretion in the founding contract of the IO,
screening and selection procedures of the IO to which a task is delegated
(especially the selection of management and staff), institutional checks and
balances within the IO, monitoring and reporting requirements, and sanctions
(Hawkins et al. 2006: 26–31). An important additional mechanism of securing
IO compliance relates to the control by principals of IO financial arrange-
ments. In their relationships with the World Bank and IMF, for instance,
principals’ deliberate under-funding so that they can employ supplementary
finance as a bargaining tool, and their increasing use of trust funds, have been
highlighted as mechanisms of increasing their leverage over the IFIs (Gould
2003; Weaver 2007: 500; Broome 2008: 126).
Yet, in order to effectively utilise the tools of compliance at their disposal,
states must be able to monitor the output of their agent-IOs. The task of
monitoring is often highly complex, and it is especially difficult to assess the
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impact of IOs on complicated global issues. The more readily observable and
measurable an IO’s ‘progress’ toward a stated goal is, the greater scope there is
for control of the agent (Kassim and Menon 2003: 124; Worsham and Gattrell,
2005: 366; Nielson et al. 2006: 111–2; Nosal 2006: 1093; Lane 2007: 616). As a
recent IMF evaluation of internal reform efforts noted, change had been most
effectively implemented when principles have clearly articulated the outcomes
that they wished to see, and set up quantifiable targets with which to monitor
them (IMF 2007: 6).
As the following empirical sections show, the PA approach is of use in
foregrounding the importance of creditor-state principals in setting the agenda
for the PRSP initiative, and in directing attention to the ability of states to use
compliance mechanisms to ensure that the IFIs remain ‘on-task’ with their
goals. However, the approach suffers from two significant lacunae, which need
to be addressed in order for a fuller appreciation of the evolution of the PRSP
initiative to be gained. First, the question of the socialisation of states must be
addressed, an issue that reveals an important lesson about the drivers of change
in the IFIs. Second, attention must be directed to the complex process through
which broad policy goals are translated into concrete operational practices in
the IFIs. Although the existence of this latter process is implicit within the PA
approach, and indeed could be taken as evidence of the IO simply doing its job
of accomplishing delegated tasks, in the case of the PRSP initiative the initial
goals that were set were so broad that it was only through the subsequent
feedback process that their operational content was defined.
In a marked contrast to the PA model, the constructivist approach attempts
to go beyond an examination of the conditions that allow for IO autonomy,
instead examining what motivates IOs to act and why they use their autonomy
in particular ways. This approach, its advocates suggest, is particularly
apposite to the study of IOs, as it can uncover the subtle and less visible
ways through which they manufacture autonomy and deploy power in the
international arena (Weaver 2007: 497). Broadly, two linked but separable
aspects of the constructivist approach to IOs can be distinguished. The first is
an emphasis on the capacity of IOs, by using their position of authority, to
frame the way in which an issue is perceived by the relevant community of
policy-makers, and the second is the view of IOs as containing strong
bureaucratic cultures that inform how external demands will be interpreted.
Regarding the former aspect, for constructivists IOs are thought to be
powerful ‘not so much because they possess material or informational
resources but, more fundamentally, because of their authority to orient action
and create social reality’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 6). Through a process
of classification, fixing of meaning and diffusion of norms, IOs are able to not
only solve the problems and pursue the collective interests that were encoded
by states in their founding principles, but also to help define and re-define these
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problems and collective interests. According to constructivists, the dissemina-
tion of international norms within a social environment shapes state behaviour
by framing the way in which policy-makers view an issue (Immergut 1998:
14–9; Alderson 2001: 421; Johnston 2001: 488).
The second aspect of IO power as seen by the constructivist approach is the
tendency to filter and interpret external stimuli through a strong bureaucratic
culture. It is argued that the bureaucratic culture, the rules and procedures that
are consciously or sub-consciously shared by IO staff, pervasively influence
bureaucrats’ views of the world and inform their views of appropriate action.
Bureaucratic culture, for Weaver, is defined as
The set of ‘basic assumptions’ that affect how organisational actors interpret
their environment, select and process information, and make decisions so as
to maintain a consistent view of the world and the organisation’s role in it.
(2008: 37)
Bureaucratic culture is said to make change within IOs highly path
dependent, as staff are more receptive to new goals that can be easily
accommodated within their existing worldview. If a new goal can be seen to
cohere with the organisation’s existing knowledge about how to realise its
mission, staff are likely to attempt to actively implement it (Barnett and
Finnemore 2004: 64). It has been suggested, for example, that the technocratic,
rules-based self-image of IMF staff, and their near homogeneous macro-
economic educational background, has meant that changes in staff practices
occur when they can be shown, according to acceptable econometric standards,
to contribute to the overall goal of advancing monetary stability and aggregate
economic growth (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 68–9). In contrast, the more
heterogeneous educational background of Bank staff, and their immersion in
the ‘messy’ world of developmental economics, are said to have made the
organisation more flexible and accommodating of a range of supplementary
goals (Vetterlein 2006: 125).4
As is demonstrated through the elaboration of the case study over the
following sections, the value of the constructivist approach is in showing the
important role played by IOs in fixing the meaning of loosely defined concepts,
and in diffusing norms that impact on the socialisation of states. This process
can be seen to occur not only after an IO has been ‘issued its orders’ by its state-
principal, but can also be seen in IOs’ elaboration of the social environment that
informs states’ preferences. However, by foregrounding the manner in which
intersubjective contexts determine outcomes, the constructivist approach
can obscure the role of agency, particularly the agency of powerful states, in
re-shaping the social environment within which IOs must act.
To sum-up the dominant models of change in IOs, then, the PA approach is
primarily interested in the benefits from delegation and the mechanisms of
Journal of International Relations and Development
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control available to states, whereas the constructivist approach focuses analysis
on the level of the IO, and highlights the importance of social environments in
determining change. Following the example laid down by a number of
innovative contributions to the project of understanding change in IOs (Haas
and Haas 2002; Jupille et al. 2003; Pollack 2003; Nielson et al. 2006; Weaver
and Park 2007), it is the position of this article that rather than viewing the PA
and constructivist approaches as offering competing interpretations, our
understanding of processes of change in IOs is best furthered by viewing
them as complementary. By conceptualising change in IOs as occurring
through ‘morphogenic cycles’ (Archer 1985; Carlsnaes 1992; Adler 1997: 330),
it is possible to advance a framework capable of synthesising the PA and
constructivist approaches.
The central contribution of a morphogenic approach is that it provides an
analytic framework around which to integrate structure and agency in the
process of change in IOs. In isolation, the PA approach foregrounds the
importance of (state-)agency at the expense of examining intersubjective
structures, whereas the constructivist approach foregrounds the importance of
ideational structures in a manner that can obscure the role of agency. With its
conceptualisation of the relationship between social structures and agents
as codeterminant, the morphogenic framework allows us to view social change
as ‘endless cycles of structural conditioning/social interaction/structural
elaboration’ (Archer 1985: 61), which integrates structure and agency rather
than privileging one or the other. To give an illustrative example, although the
PA approach can be employed to convincingly examine the important role of
states in pressing the IFIs to cut back the number of conditions attached to
loans (Gould 2006), an examination of the social environment that informed
states’ understanding of excess conditionality as a problem in need of remedial
action would provide a more comprehensive account of the process of change
in this policy area. Hence, with the morphogenic approach, the PA approach’s
placing of causal primacy with exogenously given state preferences can be
combined with the focus on intersubjective structures of the constructivist
approach.
In addition, the morphogenic approach provides the means with which to
expand the focus of analysis from the ‘high-level’ interactions between creditor
states and IFIs, to consider the often unexamined ‘low-level’ interactions
between borrower states and IOs that can be of crucial importance in
determining the evolution of IFI policy changes. When looking at policy
outcomes using the morphogenic approach, one can see that
Policy actions become intertwined with their multifarious structural
consequences, and together conjoin in constituting the future dispositions
of actors and hence also their intentions and subsequent actions y This
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implies a feedback loop [in the process of determining of outcomes].
(Carlsnaes 1992: 261)
As the following empirical sections demonstrate, the morphogenic approach
captures the complex, multilevel feedback process through which G7 arti-
culations, themselves conditioned by a pre-existing structural environment,
have been taken-up and shaped by the IFIs into a policy framework, before
then further evolving through subsequent interactions with borrowing
countries. Figure 1 provides a schematic presentation of a morphogenic model
of change in IOs, and serves as a template around which the following analysis
of the evolution of the core aspects of the PRSP initiative is structured.5
The PRSP Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief
The PRSP Initiative was formally announced by the Boards of the World Bank
and IMF at their joint meeting of December 1999, when it was presented both
Interaction I
Social environment in which issue x is understood
to be a problem requiring IFI action 
Interaction II
Issue x is precisely defined, and IFI
action is measurable  
Issue x is not precisely defined, and /
or IFI action is not measurable  
Interaction
III, IV, V etc. 
Interaction 
III, IV, V etc.
Major alteration to the understanding
of x, and / or of required IFI action  
Minor alteration to the understanding
of x, and / or of required IFI action  
Figure 1 Morphogenic model of change in IOs.
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a means of operationalising debt reduction and of transforming the relation-
ship between the IFIs and indebted countries. Through this third section of the
article, I provide a reading of the evolution of the PRSP initiative in terms of
morphogenic cycles, around which the insights of the PA and constructivist
approaches can be synthesised. There are three central aspects to the initiative,
which are namely:
! Formalising IFI debt reduction to ‘sustainable’ levels.
! Placing poverty-reduction at the centre of the IFIs’ missions.
! Encouraging broad societal participation in the formation of restructuring
programmes.
Each of these aspects shall be examined individually, before the final
section of the article reflects upon what they reveal about change in IOs. With
each of these aspects of the PRSP initiative, clear evidence can be seen of
the main creditor states communicating tasks to the IFIs that were then
incorporated into the initiative as announced in 1999. At the same time,
however, analysis of the social environment preceding creditor states’
pronouncements, and of the factors that have interacted in determining the
manner in which the central aspects of the initiative have been operationalised,
show that it is necessary to hold a nuanced conceptualisation of the process of
change in IOs.
Regarding the formalisation of the process of multilateral debt reduction,
changes in the social environment occurred during the decade leading up to the
PRSP initiative. The issue of IFI debt write-off was first raised within the G7
countries as far back as 1987, at the time when the Fund launched the
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). When the Fund proposed
the plan to extend the repayment schedules of loans and lower the rates of
interest through the ESAF, the UK government attempted to gather support
amongst the G7 for write-off as a solution to problems of heavily indebted
countries. However, UK efforts to unite the G7 were unsuccessful, and
refinancing through the ESAF emerged as the favoured route (Evans 1999:
271). The issue of IFI debt write-off rose up the agenda of the international
debt regime again during the 1990s. By 1992, a number of individual NGOs
had begun to gear up their activities in regard to multilateral write-off,
focussing their attention in particular on lobbying G7 governments to exert
their influence within the IFIs. Over the next few years, there was a
snowballing of efforts by NGOs working on debt-related issues, and in 1995
the World Bank itself made an interjection into the issue. Shortly after James
Wolfensohn became President of the Bank a small task force was established to
investigate the issue, and a working paper that was supportive of multilateral
debt relief was leaked to the press (Callaghy 2004: 29). Indeed, Wolfensohn has
been credited with playing a key role in maintaining debt reduction as a high
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profile international issue during his presidency (Mallaby 2006).6 It is with this
background context in mind that the pronouncements of the G7 states are best
understood.
The 1995 G7 Halifax meeting was taken as an opportunity to put pressure,
in a public arena, on the IFIs to incorporate debt reduction into their
operations. The Halifax Communique´ reads:
We recognise that some of the poorest countries have substantial
multilateral debt burdens. We will encourage the Bretton Woods institutions
to develop a comprehensive approach to assist countries with multilateral
debt problems, through the flexible implementation of existing instruments
and new mechanisms where necessary. (Paragraph 29, emphasis added)
This declaration is particularly important because it provides evidence
of the G7 suggesting for the first time that significant operational changes
on the part of the IFIs might be necessary in this issue area (Callaghy 2004: 29).
Although, by this time, there was a growing level of support within the
Bank for moves in this direction, particularly because the heavy debt burden
could be understood in terms of its negative impact on the Bank’s deve-
lopmental mission,7 in the IMF there is evidence of much greater resistance.
Recently released archival documents show the depth of this resistance from
the Fund.
The majority of the discussion during the IMF Executive Board meeting
(EBM) on 24 February, 1995 was on the issue of the IFIs and heavily indebted
states. Michel Camdessus, then Fund Managing Director, opened the meeting
with a synopsis of IMF research into external debt sustainability. Camdessus
relayed the following information to those present:
Our conclusions are limited but moderately reassuring. That after reaching a
hump, the burden of multilateral debt service will be declining for most poor
countries. (IMF 1995: 1)
Although Camdessus acknowledged that there were ‘six or seven’ countries
for whom debt service may become ‘too burdensome’, he suggested that
support for these could come primarily from bilateral and regional sources
(IMF 1995: 3). In response to this statement, Huw Evans, the UK Executive
Director, presented the following combative reply:
My conclusion is that the problem is more serious than the Fund staff paper
admits y The conclusion of the staff paper is that: if these countries
improve their economic performance, if all new multilateral and bilateral
lending is concessional, if the downward trend in concessional flows and
grants is reversed, and if there are no adverse shocks, then the number of
countries unable to manage their multilateral debts will be small. It is not
Journal of International Relations and Development
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prudent to base policy upon such a combination of favourable outcomes.
(IMF 1995: 9–10 emphasis added)
When the issue of IFI debt write-off was again discussed in detail at an EBM
in February 1996, the minutes record similar strong support for the idea from
the US Executive Director, Karin Lissakers. Lissakers outlined the official US
position in opposition to that of some IMF members of staff:
We reject the argument of some speakers that debt reduction would weaken
the multilateral institutions y It is not contrary to good financial
management that one recognises bad loans and that one follows up with
specific measures. It is not contrary. While there are differences between the
Fund and the World Banky it is not inconsistent and it is not contrary to
good management of these institutions if we set out an explicit programme
of debt reduction. (IMF 1996a: 31 emphasis added)
Similar sentiments from Lissakers are recorded in the minutes of the EBM 6
weeks later, on 8 April (IMF 1996b: 3), which suggests that resistance from the
Fund to debt relief was both ongoing and deep-seated.
Despite this reluctance from the IMF to classify multilateral debt as a
problem requiring action on its part, in late 1996, the Fund and the Bank
announced the birth of systematic IFI debt reduction through the HIPC
initiative. In doing so, the IFIs contributed to the fixing of the meaning of
‘unsustainable debt’, and also helped to define it as a problem requiring
remedial action on their part. In order to be eligible for debt relief from the
IFIs, it was announced that countries must be in an ‘unsustainable’ debt
position, which was defined as either a debt-to-export ratio of 150 per cent or,
for open economies, a debt-to-revenue ratio of 250 per cent. For these
countries, it was decided that for the first time their debts to the IFIs could be
systematically written off in order to bring them toward a ‘sustainable’
position. In 1999 debt reduction was deepened, when it was announced that
upon completion of a PRSP up to 90 per cent of a country’s debt to the Bank
and Fund could be written off (Callaghy 2004: 17).
An important supplementary development in the IFI debt reduction
practices was the extension of the amount of relief to 100 per cent. In July
2001, in the face of calls from NGOs and some political representatives for the
extension of multilateral debt relief to 100 per cent, the IFIs released a joint
paper explaining the reasons for their opposition to such a development. The
paper suggested that such a level of reduction is not necessary by referring to
the resources that had already been released through existing mechanisms, and
by outlining the likely detrimental effects to other IFI concessional lending that
would result from the reduction. It is suggested that further reductions would
lead to ‘a direct dollar-for-dollar reduction in IDA’s ability to make future
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credits to poor countries’, and that ‘debt cancellation would deplete the
resources of the PRGF Trust and force the closure of the facility’ (IMF and
World Bank 2001: 1–4). Whereas previously the Bank had ‘made sense’ of the
initial calls to introduce debt reduction into its practices in the mid-1990s in
terms of its contribution to developmental goals, the calls to extend reduction
to 100 per cent were met with a different response. In contrast, these calls, as
the above response shows, were understood as being antagonistic to its
capacity to function as a bank.8 The opposition from the Fund, which
expressed scepticism that the supposed benefits of debt reduction had not been
adequately demonstrated in terms of its contribution to macroeconomic
stability or growth, remained constant.9
Regardless of the very public opposition of the IFIs to the extension of the
debt reduction ceiling to 100 per cent, under intense public and NGO pressure
the G7 in 2005 issued a call for them to implement such a policy through the
Gleneagles Communique´ (G7 2005: Paragraph 29). In the following year, a
new initiative was announced by the IFIs to allow for the full cancellation of
the debts owed by the poorest borrowers to the Bank and Fund: the
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). As was the case with the previous
90 per cent reduction, the granting of debt write-off under the MDRI is
conditional on the production of a satisfactory PRSP by an indebted country
government (IDA 2006: 1–3).
The continuing dynamism of the issue of IFI debt reduction and debt
sustainability can be seen in the recent development of the Debt Sustainability
Framework (DSF) by the IMF and World Bank. Through the DSF the
IFIs have moved to reformulate the policy response norm to the problem of
unsustainable debt, from one of debt write-off by the IFIs, to one of
responsible borrowing by poor countries. The DSF was launched in response
to IFI research findings that, following IFI debt reduction, borrowing from
domestic and bilateral sources was hindering several countries’ transition
toward ‘sustainable’ overall debt levels. With the DSF, the IFIs now provide
borrowing ‘guideposts’ to countries that have benefited from debt relief,
and can adjust their own lending in the light of above-target borrowing
(IDA 2006: 1).
How, then, should we understand the evolution of the multilateral debt
reduction aspect of the PRSP initiative? Figure 1 provides a schematic
representation of the morphogenic approach, around which a comprehensive
account can be framed. At the beginning of the cycle (Interaction I), we see the
influence of the World Bank (and NGO groups) in contributing to the
elaboration of a social environment in which multilateral debt was understood
as an issue requiring IFI remedial action. This structural context conditioned
the G7 1995 call for a new approach from the IFIs to deal with multilateral
debt, and the IFIs’ quantification of sustainable debt and reduction quotas
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(Interaction II). With the establishment of this clear understanding of the issue,
and of the action required by the IFIs, further interactions led to small changes
at the margins (i.e. the morphogenic cycle bifurcated along the right-hand
pathway in Figure 1). G7 pressure to increase the proportion of debt eligible
for reduction and the IFI introduction of the idea of responsible borrowing
through the DSF have led to only minor alterations to the understanding of
debt sustainability and of the action required by the IFIs on this issue. Aided
by the tractability of the issue, the creditor states have had a high degree of
control over this aspect of the initiative.
Poverty Reduction-centred Development Strategies
There are striking similarities between the contexts within which the G7 made
their initial pronouncements on the issue of poverty reduction and on debt
sustainability as outlined above. As with debt write-off, there was an element
of the G7 ‘preaching to the choir’ by calling for the Bank to ensure that a focus
on poverty reduction was tied-in to the forthcoming initiative, whereas the call
to mainstream poverty reduction was less amenable to the operating
procedures of the Fund. As the initiative has been rolled out, the lofty
ambitions for PRSPs as articulated by the IFIs have generally not been met by
the analytical quality of the Papers produced, which has led the IFIs to re-
present their role in this aspect of the PRSP initiative as providers of capacity
strengthening measures to assist countries to move toward a poverty reduction-
centred approach to development over a longer time-frame. Unlike debt
sustainability, which was rapidly given an unambiguous meaning requiring a
monitorable response from the IFIs, the role of the IFIs in mainstreaming
poverty reduction in the PRSP initiative has remained relatively fluid.
Although the G7 made the call to the IFIs to ensure that poverty reduction
was at the centre of what was to become the PRSP initiative back in 1998,
within the World Bank a ‘poverty reduction agenda’ had been growing
incrementally for some time. A change occurred whereby the Bank moved
from a view of development as coterminous with rising GDP per capita, to a
broader view whereby, although rising GDP is still seen as vitally important, it
is as much due to the links between economic growth and poverty reduction,
democratisation, and sustainable development than as simply an end in itself
(Pender 2001: 403–7; Vetterlein 2006: 126–8).10 Because of the importance of
the Bank in ‘shaping the boundaries and nature of mainstream development
debates’ (Mawdsley and Rigg 2002: 93), such changes can be considered to
have helped shape the normative context that informed the G7 articulation of
1998. In contrast to the growing view within the Bank that poverty reduction
was at the centre of its mission, at the Fund a more ambivalent view was
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maintained, whereby poverty reduction was seen as linked in a loose and
ill-defined way to its primary mission of maintaining global economic stability
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 65; Vetterlein 2006: 132). In particular, the
intensive focus on distributional concerns that is implied by a poverty
reduction-centred approach does not fit well with the Fund’s established
practice of dealing with data on an aggregate, macroeconomic level (Garuda
2000: 1031).
Against this background, a shift toward the promotion of poverty reduction-
centred development by the large quota-holding states can be seen in the late
1990s. It was at the 1998 summit in Birmingham when, under the leadership
of the then UK Chancellor Gordon Brown and Secretary of State for Inter-
national Development Clare Short, the G7 became committed to pressuring
the IFIs to institutionalise this approach to development (Christiansen
and Hovland 2003: 16). The prominent position in which the commitment
of the G7 to the goal of ‘achieving sustainable economic growth and
development throughout the world [to] enable developing countries to grow
faster and reduce poverty’ was placed in the Birmingham Communique´,
and the link made to IFI debt reduction a few paragraphs later (Paragraphs 2
and 7), are evidence of this shift. The report of the finance ministers to the
summit in Cologne the following year shows a strengthening of the G7
position. Referring to the need to reform the HIPC Initiative, the report
urges that
The new HIPC Initiative should be built upon an enhanced framework for
poverty reductionyWe call upon the World Bank and the IMF to develop
by the time of their Annual Meetings [in six months time] specific plans for
such an enhanced framework for poverty reduction. (G7 1999: Paragraphs
4–6)
The G7 had, by mid-1999, laid out a clear call to the Bank and Fund to tie
poverty reduction to their forthcoming initiative.
When announced in late 1999, the IFIs clearly stated the ambitious nature
of PRSPs. As its name signifies, poverty reduction was to be central
to the initiative, and the guidelines of the IFIs suggest that PRSPs should
contain policy programmes that were proven to deliver an optimal impact on
poverty:
Poverty reduction strategies will identify the priorities for public action
that will have the greatest impact on reducing poverty. They should
contain systematic and participatory analyses of poverty, short- and long-
term tradeoffs of alternative policy decisions, and the impact of proposed
reforms on the most vulnerable social groups (IMF & World Bank 1999:
Paragraph 2).
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The call from the G7, therefore, was more than met in the language of the
IFIs. As the initiative was rolled out, however, further inputs into the evolution
of this aspect were encountered that have led to a significant re-articulation by
the IFIs of their role in relation to promoting poverty reduction within the
PRSP initiative.
In spite of the G7 declarations and the optimistic introduction of the
initiative from the IFIs, PRSPs have at best represented a minor step toward
placing poverty reduction at the centre of development programmes. In a 2003
review of its operations in relation to the PRSP Initiative, the Fund is candid
about the weaknesses of PRSPs that had impeded their ability to provide an
analysis of different policy options according to their contribution to the
reduction of poverty levels within a country.
Poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) of key reformsy is an important
tool that low income countries should systematically employ in assessing
policy choices and tradeoffs. While over time it is expected that these
countries will carry out and integrate PSIA into the design of their poverty
reduction strategies, they face of number of challenges at present which
impede their ability to do so, including data, analytical, and institutional
capacity constraints. (IMF 2003: 14)
Although the report calls for assistance from development partners to fill
this analytical gap, and affirms the commitment of its own staff to helping
indebted country governments in this regard, it concludes that it ‘may take
some time’ before such capacity is built-up (IMF 2003: 9). More recently, the
World Bank too has been very open about the weak capacity of both the IFIs
and developing country governments to produce analyses of different policy
options on the grounds of their contribution to poverty reduction (World
Bank 2004: viii). Hence, following the disjuncture between their initial
ambitious articulations on the poverty reduction focus of PRSPs and the
reality of the Papers, the IFIs have moved to reconstruct their role as one of
providing long-term PSIA capacity-building assistance.
The schematic representation of the morphogenic approach in Figure 1 can
again be used as a framework around which to present a comprehensive
understanding of the process of change in the IFIs. In contrast to the issue of
debt sustainability, the issue of poverty reduction progressed along the loosely
controlled, left-hand side of the morphogenic model. The cycle begins with the
shift toward an explicit focus on poverty reduction within the Bank
(Interaction I), which contributed to the elaboration of a social environment
in which poverty reduction was understood to be a pressing global issue,
potentially requiring action from the IFIs. This structural context conditioned
the 1998 calls from the G7 for the IFIs to implement a poverty reduction
framework, and the IFIs’ setting of a rigorous benchmark for the poverty
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reduction analysis within PRSPs (Interaction II). However, despite the
rhetorical strength of the announcements, a clear understanding of ‘poverty
reduction’ or of the action required by the IFIs was not constructed. This
opened the potential for significant operational flexibility, and for the
traditional ambiguity of the Fund to distributional concerns to come into
play. As the third set of interactions unfolded, the IFIs have moved to redefine
their role in the promotion of poverty reduction-centred development as
providers of capacity strengthening measures to indebted countries, justified
through reference to the low analytical quality of the original Papers. In so
doing, they have moved to significantly alter the understanding of their role in
the promotion of the poverty reduction-centred conceptualisation of deve-
lopment, and have downgraded the extent to which this aspect of the initiative
represents a significant shift in IFI practices.
The ‘Participatory Turn’ of the IFIs
Moving on to the third, and final, aspect of the PRSP Initiative to be analysed,
I now consider the promotion of broad societal participation in the formation
of restructuring programmes. As with the two aspects of the PRSP initiative
examined above, the Fund was initially something of a reluctant partner in
the ‘participatory turn’, where again the Bank and NGOs contributed to
shaping the intersubjective context that conditioned the G7 articulations on
this matter. As the evolution of the ‘participatory turn’ progressed, resistance
from some indebted country governments highlighted the internal tension
between IFI support for broad participation and their avowed apoliticism,
which led to a significant hollowing-out of the participatory aspect of the
PRSP initiative.
Prior to the calls from the G7 for the IFIs to encourage greater partici-
pation in the formation of restructuring programmes, some support for
participatory activities existed in the Bank. Changes in Bank practices in this
area can be traced to the early 1990s, when the Bank began to both engage
directly with civil society organisations and to encourage governments to
include them in decision-making processes (Harrison 2004: 123–4; Pincus and
Winters 2000: 12). NGOs, through their highly critical campaigns from the
early 1980s, were an important driver of these developments at the Bank
(Weaver 2008: 66).
The calls from the G7 to incorporate a greater focus on participation into
their practices thus followed the nascent practices of the Bank. The G7 Finance
Ministers’ statement at the Cologne summit in mid-1999 sent a clear signal to
the IFIs regarding the promotion of participation, and this message was
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sustained through the period of IFI planning preceding the announcement of
the PRSP initiative. The Cologne statement declared to the IFIs that
Throughout programme design and implementation, there should be
consultations with broader segments of civil society. Such dialogue will be
the basis for deepening the sense of ‘ownership’ [of adjustment programmes]
with governments and citizens in debtor countries. (Paragraph 5)
Advocacy from within the G7 for the inclusion of a participatory
requirement in the enhanced HIPC arrangements continued in the run-up to
the announcement of the initiative. One month prior to its announcement, at a
joint World Bank-IMF conference on the modalities of debt write-off in
August 1999, the UK submission reiterated that greater programme ownership
must be a ‘key objective’, to be primarily accomplished through in-country
consultation during the design of programmes (IMF 1999: 140).
When the IFIs announced the initiative in 1999, the G7 articulations
on the desirability of a participatory requirement were reflected in their
guidelines for the processes surrounding PRSP formation. In a guidance note
of early 2000, issued to clarify the scope of the initiative, it was stated by the
IFIs that
Poverty reduction strategies are expected to be country-owned and
designed in a participatory fashion, taking into account the views of
Parliaments and (where they exist) other democratic bodies, the donor
community, civil society and specifically the poor themselves. (World Bank
and IMF 2000: 1)
At the point of the launch of the PRSP initiative, then, the G7 and the Bank
can both be seen to be supportive of the inclusion of the promotion of broad
based participation in the formation of restructuring programmes. Simulta-
neous developments were occurring in the IMF, through which the Fund also
began to conceptualise broader participation in the formation of restructuring
programmes to be of central importance to the accomplishment of its mission.
Within the Fund, support for broadening participation has strengthened
from around the time of the PRSP launch because of the links that are thought
to exist between participation in programme formation, ‘ownership’ of a
programme, and its successful implementation.11 Following the production of
a number of assessments by the Fund outlining the low implementation rates
of ESAF restructuring programmes (Killick 2002: 5), a large amount of
research was undertaken into the issue. The proliferation of staff papers on the
issue since 2001 is illustrative of this movement (Cordella and Dell’Ariccia
2001; Khan and Sharma 2001; Boughton and Mourmouras 2002; Boughton
2003; Ivanovna 2006), as are the recently updated staff guidelines outlining the
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benefits that are likely to accrue from broader in-country consultation (IMF
2008).
Despite the growing support of the Fund, it is readily admitted by the IFIs
that the participatory processes surrounding the formation of PRSPs have
varied substantially from country-to-country, and that ‘in general, the process
has not generated meaningful discussions y of alternative policy options’
(IMF 2004: 3). By approving such PRSPs as providing an acceptable basis for
debt reduction, the IFIs have tacitly hollowed-out the ‘process conditionality’
within the initiative.12 As acknowledged by the Bank and Fund themselves,
the reason for this outcome lies in the tension between the promotion of
participation and their status as apolitical institutions. The Articles of
Agreement of the Fund and Bank preclude them from taking into account a
consideration of domestic political factors when making loan arrangements,
and this practice is well established in both institutions (Manzo 2003: 444).13
To penalise countries for insufficiently fulfilling the PRSP process condition-
ality would challenge this cultural tenet. This tension, as is noted in an IMF
review of the PRSP Initiative, contributed to the IFIs’ failure to specify what
‘broad participation’ should imply (IMF 2004: 23). Although moves by the
IFIs to depart from the norm of apoliticism and to proactively work toward
engaging a broader range of domestic actors can be seen, especially so by the
Bank,14 the PRSP initiative has not been used as the vehicle through which
such a change is operationalised.
A comprehensive understanding of the evolution of the participatory
requirement can be advanced by drawing on the framework outlined in
Figure 1. As was the case in relation to the previously examined aspects, the
Bank (Interaction I) contributed to the elaboration of a social environment in
which the promotion of broad participation by the IFIs was seen to be
desirable. This structural context informed the G7 calls for the institutionalisa-
tion of broader participatory practices by the Bank and Fund, and the setting
by the IFIs of ‘broad social participation’ as one of the PRSP requirements
(Interaction II). However, a precise definition of participation, and, vitally, of
the role of the IFIs in promoting this aspect of the initiative, was not set out:
thus, this morphogenic cycle bifurcates to the left-hand path of Figure 1, with
later interactions leading to significant alterations of the understanding of this
issue and of the IFIs’ role within it. Subsequently, as Papers were produced by
indebted country governments that were inadequate in terms of the
participatory process requirement, the IFIs’ established apoliticism has led to
a significant hollowing-out of this aspect of the initiative. As was the case with
poverty reduction, the high degree of ‘wriggle-room’ that was left in the initial
understanding of the participatory requirement meant that the input of
borrowing countries and the internal culture of the IFIs was of greater
importance in determining the path of change.
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Conclusion: The Morphogenic Model of Change in IOs
Change in the practices of the World Bank and IMF is a multilevel process,
through which the interactions of creditor states, the IFIs, and (to a lesser
extent) borrower states shape dynamic understandings about desirable and
appropriate action. Because of the complexity of the process, it is necessary to
adopt a flexible analytic framework capable of capturing the iterative process
whereby interactions both shape and are shaped by the social environment in
which they take place. The Archerian morphogenic cycle offers such a
framework, around which the mechanisms that have shaped the evolution of
the PRSP initiative can be holistically viewed. Figure 1 provides a schematic
representation of the analytic framework. Using a morphogenic model to
synthesise the agential influence of state preferences and the structural
influence of social environments, the insights of the two dominant approaches
to the study of IOs can be incorporated to provide a more nuanced analytic
framework for comprehending contemporary processes of change within
international organisations.
At the beginning of the cycle (Interaction I), we find a subtle — and often
unexamined — source of IO influence into the process of change, as they
are able to contribute to the elaboration of the understanding of an issue
within a social environment. The Bank in particular was ‘ahead of the
curve’ in relation to each of the three core aspects of the PRSP initiative, as
its existing practices conditioned the initial social environment of each of
the morphogenic cycles. It is only by acknowledging this structural context that
the contribution of IOs to the process of change can be comprehensively
understood.
Regarding creditor states, the fact that each of the articulations made
through the G7 forum were incorporated into the structure of the PRSP
initiative as announced by the IFIs in late 1999 shows the central role held by
creditor states in fixing the agenda for change. However, at this stage
(Interaction II) there is an important bifurcation in the morphogenic cycle.
Where the interaction of the G7 and the IFIs produced a precise definition of
an issue, and the action required by the IFIs to address this issue was
measurable, the cycle progressed along a path over which creditors were able to
exert a significant degree of control. The issue of debt reduction followed this
right-hand path, whereby the tight understanding that emerged enhanced
creditors’ ability to push for the extension of the level of debt reduction
against the desires of both the Bank and Fund. By looking inside the IFIs
and examining the bureaucratic culture, we can understand why there was
resistance,15 but by considering of the tractability of debt reduction we see that
this was an issue in which creditors held the upper hand. Hence, the further
interactions within this cycle (the extension of debt relief and the introduction
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of the DSF) led to only minor modifications to the understanding of the issue
and of the action that was required by the IFIs.
In contrast, when the interaction of creditors and the IFIs led to the
emergence of a loosely defined issue and the requisite IFI action was not easily
measurable, an evolutionary path developed over which creditors had a
reduced capacity to exert control. Along this path the internal bureaucratic
culture of the IOs, and the interactions between the IOs and borrowers, assume
a greater importance in determining the process of change.16 The loosely
defined understandings that emerged of ‘broad participation’ and ‘poverty
reduction’ and of the role of the IFIs in promoting these goals set these aspects
of the initiative along this left-hand course in Figure 1. In relation to the
‘participatory turn’, we see that the internal tension between a belief in the
benefits to be gained from broader participation and the traditional apoliticism
of the IFIs, when confronted by inadequate consultative processes in indebted
countries, resulted in a significant hollowing-out of the participatory
requirement within the initiative. In relation to the centricity of poverty
reduction in the initiative, we see that the challenges indebted countries faced in
producing PRSPs containing robust poverty impact analysis led the IFIs to
shift from an ambitious to a more limited policy response of longer term
capacity building. It is reasonable to suggest that the lack of a fit between
‘poverty reduction’ and the established goals of the Fund contributed to the
watering-down of this aspect of the initiative. In each of these instances, then, a
loosely defined initial understanding was followed by significant alterations to
the understanding of the issues, in the form of a hollowing-out of the
participatory process requirement and a dilution of the poverty reduction
requirement of the programmes contained within PRSPs.
The morphogenic model provides a clear analytic framework around which
the insights of the PA and constructivist approaches can be combined. An
important insight of the constructivist approach — that contests over the
meaning of policy problems and appropriate responses is a central component
of change in IOs — is central to understanding the evolution of the core aspects
of the PRSP initiative. In each of the aspects, we see that the IFIs played a role
in shaping the structural context that informed the initial G7 articulations, and
thereby exerted a subtle influence on the path of change. In addition, while the
PA approach highlights the conditions that allow for creditor control or IO
autonomy, the constructivist approach is useful in understanding the direction
in which autonomy is used. By conceptualising change as a continuous,
dynamic process of structural conditioning/social interaction/structural ela-
boration, the morphogenic approach allows for the insights of the PA and
constructivist models to be synthesised so as to capture the key mechanisms at
work in the evolution of the PRSP initiative. Using this framework, the focus
of the PA approach on the agency of states acting to pursue exogenously given
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interests can be combined with the constructivist foregrounding of the
importance of intersubjective structures, to successfully advance our under-
standing of the process of change in IOs. As this analysis of the evolution of the
PRSP initiative has demonstrated, change in IOs is an intricate, multilevel
process, which requires IO scholars to adopt more flexible analytic frameworks
in order to capture its complexity.
Notes
1 Many thanks are owed to Andre´ Broome for his help and advice on this article, and to several
members of the postgraduate community at POLSIS who read and commented on earlier drafts.
I am also grateful to the editors and reviewers at JIRD for their detailed comments and
insightful suggestions.
2 Thanks are owed to the individuals who participated in interviews during my research in late
2008, including in particular several executive directors and senior members of staff in both
institutions who were very generous with their time.
3 I am guided here by the ideas put forward by Johnston (2001: 488) regarding the ‘social
environment’ of IOs, and his central thesis that change in the behaviour of actors, including
state actors, ‘may have a lot to do with socialisation’.
4 The important influence of ‘bureaucratic culture’ on the adaptability of the IFIs was brought up
on a number of occasions, unprompted, during interviews with both Bank and Fund staff. The
interpretations put forward cohere with the accounts referred to above.
5 I have developed the morphogenic model by drawing on the lessons learnt from the case study of
the PRSP initiative, and as such it is best viewed as an ‘organising perspective’ that facilitates the
exploration of complex issues and provides a basis for future refinement (Rhodes 1997: 5).
6 It must also be noted that although he is often credited with pushing multilateral debt reduction
forward, opposition to 100 per cent reduction was voiced by the Bank during Wolfensohn’s
presidency. The tension between debt relief and the Bank’s ability to contribute to poverty
reduction was perhaps felt particularly keenly by Wolfensohn, with his strong and very public
support for both goals.
7 See, for example, James Wolfensohn’s welcoming of debt reduction through the HIPC initiative
as being complementary to the Bank’s developmental mission and ‘very good news for the poor
of the world’ (1996).
8 This point was also made during an interview by a World Bank country economist for one of the
HIPCs, who discussed the promises of George W. Bush to reform IDA’s operations so as to ‘not
just drop the debt, but stop the debt’ (2001) in terms of their potentially fatal implications for
IDA.
9 Indeed, Fund publications on debt relief continue to treat this as an open question, yet to be
adequately resolved by empirical research (e.g. Clements et al. 2008).
10 The important contribution of James Wolfensohn (Bank President from 1995 to 2005) to the
broadening the developmental agenda, particularly through his efforts to recruit staff from a
wider range of academic and professional backgrounds, was noted by a number of senior World
Bank members of staff during interviews.
11 It has been suggested (e.g. Lazarus 2008) that the Fund’s ‘participatory turn’ was an attempt to
counteract its perceived legitimacy crisis in the late 1990s. While this may have been a
contributing factor, I suggest that, because of its fit with the technocratic, evidenced-based
culture of the Fund, the growing ‘political economy’ knowledge regarding the participation-
ownership-implementation nexus is of deeper significance.
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12 The term ‘process condition’ is used by Frazer (2005: 318) to describe the participatory
requirement within the PRSP initiative.
13 In relation to the Fund see Article XXX1 Section C Paragraphs iv and vii, and in relation to the
Bank Article IV Section 10.
14 Through in particular the Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) agenda, the Bank seems to
be proactively engaging civil society to support reform efforts. An interview with a Bank
member of staff working on GAC shed an interesting light on the tension between GAC and the
Bank’s traditional apoliticism. When questioned on this issue, the interviewee responded that:
‘Some Country Directors hide behind the Articles of Agreement, but this [GAC] has support
from the top’. Creditors’ recent establishment of a US$100 million Governance Partnership
Facility to support GAC civil society outreach, and the creation of a monthly Governance
Council that is chaired by the Bank President or a Vice-President, suggests that the Bank is in
the process of becoming more involved in domestic governance reform. Though representing a
challenge to its established apoliticism, the Bank justifies this shift in terms of its central
mandate: ‘[The Bank’s] focus on governance and anticorruption (GAC) follows from its
mandate to reduce poverty — a capable and accountable state creates opportunities for poor
people, provides better services, and improves development outcomes’ (World Bank 2007: 1).
15 Broadly, resistance came because extended reduction was understood by both the Bank and
Fund to be detrimental to their ability to pursue their central missions.
16 It is conceivable that further interactions between creditors, the IFIs, and borrowers could lead
to the elaboration of a tightly defined understanding of an issue requiring easily monitorable IFI
actions, and so there is a route from the left- to the right-hand paths. However, neither of the
looser aspects of the PRSP initiative that were examined followed this route.
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